## Incentive-Compatible Auction Mechanisms for Network Procurement

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**Abstract.** The allocation of scarce resources is an important task in information systems. We focus on network procurement where a telecommunications provider aims to connect specific nodes in a network. To establish connection between nodes, the provider needs to buy the respective edge. In this strategic version of the Steiner Minimum Tree problem the edges are owned by bidders with private costs. Thus, in order to find an efficient solution, a mechanism that incentivizes participants to state their costs truthfully and runs in polynomial time is required. Recently, deferred-acceptance auctions have been proposed to solve NP-hard allocation problems. We implement several approximation mechanisms and provide an extensive experimental analysis comparing the average-case solution quality of deferred-acceptance algorithms with that of traditional approximation algorithms. We find that deferred-acceptance algorithms are comparable or even outperform the best approximation algorithms on instances from the SteinLib test data collection.

**Keywords:** Steiner tree problem, approximation mechanism, deferredacceptance auction

## 1 Introduction

Many information systems nowadays are designed to coordinate activities or allocate scarce resources. The design of respective information systems has a number of challenges because incentives of the participants need to be considered, but also computational problems play a role. This has led to a fruitful line of research on the design of electronic markets [1-5].

We focus on a specific market design application, the procurement of networks and aim for auction mechanisms that lead to efficient outcomes and exhibit simple strategies for the suppliers to bid truthful. Such mechanisms are also referred to as implementable, incentive compatible, or strategyproof, in case bidders even have a dominant strategy. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is the unique strategyproof and efficient mechanism, and its generality is remarkable [6]. Unfortunately, the VCG mechanism requires the auctioneer to solve the allocation

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problem exactly. This cannot be expected in large NP-hard resource allocation problems.

There is significant literature in the design of approximation algorithms for computationally hard problems [7]. Algorithmic mechanism design extends this literature in an important way [6]. The goal of approximation mechanisms is to design algorithms that run in polynomial time and satisfy strong game-theoretical equilibrium solution concepts such that bidders have incentives to reveal their valuations truthfully and the auctioneer can determine the optimal allocation or one that approximates the optimal solution. Typically, designers of approximation mechanisms aim for dominant-strategy incentive compatibility or strategyproofness. Such mechanisms are prior-free and truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for individual bidders.

Network procurement is a prime application where auction mechanisms play an important role in business practice. A telecommunication company is interested in connecting several sites or terminals via a cost-minimal set of edges connecting vertices in a network. The terminals constitute a subset of all vertices in the network and suppliers can provide individual edges in the network at certain cost. The Steiner Minimum Tree problem (SMT) is a well-known model of this network procurement problem. Even with complete information about suppliers' costs, finding a cost-minimal solution is NP-hard. The SMT problem on graphs is one of the most well-known NP-complete problems [8], and central in various types of network design problems, which have received significant attention in operations research [9-11].

In the procurement environment, the costs of establishing a link is the private information of its supplier. Each supplier wants to maximize her payoff, i.e., her bids minus her private cost for setting up the connection. In such an auction, the auctioneer wants to set incentives for bidders to reveal their costs truthfully. Since the SMT problem is NP-complete, its optimal solution, which corresponds to the maximally achievable social welfare, cannot be expected to be obtained in reasonable time.

This paper reviews several well-known approximation algorithms for the SMT problem in settings where the edges of the graph are strategic agents. Based on well-known theory from mechanism design, we extend these approximation algorithms to strategyproof mechanisms, if possible.

[12] and [13] recently proposed *deferred-acceptance auctions (DAAs)*, a class of greedy algorithms which are weakly group-strategyproof for bidders with singledimensional types. This means, even a coalition of bidders cannot manipulate profitably via deviations from truthful bidding, which makes them robust against collusive bidding strategies. This is a very desirable property in many applications. Also, a deferred-acceptance auction can be implemented both as a sealed-bid and as a clock auction and it was recently characterized as *obviously strategyproof* [14], indicating that it is obvious for a player that the best outcome achievable by lying cannot be better than the worst outcome from telling the truth.

An important question is, whether these strong incentive properties are at the expense of solution quality, i.e. they might lead to low allocative efficiency. [15] studied this question from a worst-case approximation perspective. Interestingly, experimental analysis of the specific allocation problem showed very high solution

quality on average [16]. The allocation problem under consideration is quite specific and it is not clear whether one could achieve high average efficiency with a DAA also for other problems.

In our analysis, we start with the best known approximation algorithm by [21], before we analyze the approach by [19], and primal-dual algorithms [20]. These are arguably the most prominent approaches to the SMT problem in the literature.

We then compare these results to those of deferred-acceptance auctions, which were introduced by Milgrom and Segal [12]. We conclude that the practical performance of deferred acceptance algorithms, whilst having worse worst-case performance guarantees, perform well in practical implementations.

In Section 2 we introduce related literature, before we introduce the SMT and relevant definitions in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss well-known approximation algorithms for the SMT problem, and a critical payment scheme, before we introduce deferred acceptance auctions. Then, in Section 5 the results of numerical experiments based on the SteinerLib are presented.

## 2 Related Literature

Approximation algorithms based on distance networks were proposed by [17] and [18]. Mehlhorn [19] developed a faster variant of the latter algorithm. All algorithms in this class achieve an approximation ratio of 2, which is also achievable by means of primal-dual algorithms, see e.g. [20].

Loss-contracting approximations are another class of algorithms studied in the context of the SMT problem. This approach has been improved in a series of papers. The algorithm due to Robins and Zelikovsky [21] currently reaches the best approximation ratio of 1.55. Byrka, Grandoni, Rothvoß and Sanità [22] proposed a randomized technique that achieves an approximation ratio of  $\ln(4) + \epsilon$ , i.e. 1.39 in the limit. While the algorithm can be de-randomized to obtain a deterministic approximation algorithm with polynomial time complexity, the polynomial and constants required to reach the approximation factor of 1.39 result in a runtime which is not feasible in practice.

Since randomized approximation algorithms are often not acceptable in industrial procurement we focus on the design of deterministic approximation mechanisms. While there is no general framework to transform deterministic approximation algorithms into strategyproof mechanisms, there exist quite general approaches when additional conditions on bidders' valuations are met. Single-mindedness has received most attention in the literature on combinatorial auctions [11]. In this case bidders are only interested in one specific subset of items (package). This can be a reasonable assumption for many real-world markets and it is a very good starting point for our analysis of strategyproof approximation mechanism for the SMT problem on graphs.

In the context of network procurement, we talk about bidders with singledimensional types, which means each supplier only having access to a single link which she can sell. In many markets, bidders know little about the cost structures of competitors, and the analysis of the single-dimensional case can still lead to practically viable and robust mechanisms even if the assumption is not fully satisfied.

## **3** Notation and Definitions

Let G = (V, E, c) be a weighted, connected graph, where  $c_e$  is the cost of each edge  $e \in E$ . For a subset of edges  $F \subseteq E$ , the cost of the edge-induced subgraph is defined by  $c(F) = \sum_{\{e \in F\}} c_e$ . A spanning tree of G is a subset of edges of E such that the resulting edge-induced subgraph is connected, cycle-free and contains all vertices V. The minimum spanning tree, denoted by MST(G) is a spanning tree where the sum of the costs of its edges is minimal in comparison to all other spanning trees.

The SMT problem on a connected graph G = (V, E, c) is defined as follows. For a subset of vertices  $K \subseteq V$  called *terminals*, any tree spanning K is called a *Steiner tree*. Any vertex in a Steiner tree which is not a terminal is called a *Steiner point*. We refer to the set of all Steiner trees over G as StT(V, E). The objective then is to find a minimum cost Steiner tree.

Let  $G_V$  be the complete graph induced by the vertex set V, i.e., a complete weighted graph  $G_V = (V, E_V, c_V)$ , where each edge cost equals the cost of the shortest path in G between the two adjacent vertices of that edge.  $G_V$  is then a metric graph satisfying the triangle inequality. We call  $G_V$  the **distance network** of the graph G. Likewise,  $G_K$  denotes the distance network induced by the terminal set K,  $G_K = (K, E_K, c_K)$ . Note that  $G_K \subseteq G_V$ , as  $K \subseteq V$ .

In the following, we describe the design of mechanisms for the SMT problem. We consider a set of bidders N, where each bidder i only provides one specific single edge  $e_i$ . With slight abuse of notation, we also denote with E the set of bidders, with  $c_i$  the true cost of bidder i while c refers to the corresponding tuple  $(c_i)_{i \in N}$  taken over all bidders. Denote with  $B_i$  the domain of bids, i can report as her cost for edge  $e_i$ , e.g.  $B_i = \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$  and let  $B = \prod_{i \in N} B_i$ . For a *single-dimensional* bidder i there is a unique and publicly known edge  $e_i \in E$  such that her true private cost is  $c_i$  only for edge  $e_i$ , while for all other edges  $e_j \neq e_i$  her true private cost is  $\infty$ . Given a vector of reported bids  $b \in B$  with  $b = (b_i)_{i \in E}$ , the expression  $b_{-i}$  denotes the bid tuple without the i-th entry,  $b_{-i} = (b_j)_{j \in E \setminus \{i\}}$ , and  $(c_i, b_{-i})$  denotes the bid tuple where the i-th entry of b is replaced by  $c_i$ , i.e., bidder i reports her true cost.

A deterministic mechanism  $\mathcal{M} = (f, p)$  for the SMT problem over vertices V and edges E is defined by a deterministic allocation function  $\{f : B \to StT(V, E)\}$  and a payment scheme  $p_i : B \times StT(V, E) \to \mathbb{R}$  for each bidder i. Given the bidders' reported bids  $b \in C$ , the mechanism  $\mathcal{M} = (f, p)$  computes a Steiner tree f(b) and pays each bidder i a payment of  $p_i(b, f(b))$ . In an approximation mechanism, the allocation function f is implemented via a deterministic approximation allocation algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ . A mechanism with an approximation allocation algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  achieves an approximation ratio of r for SMT if

$$\max_{b \in B} \frac{c(OPT(b))}{c(\mathcal{A}(b))} \le r \tag{1}$$

where OPT(b) denotes a welfare-maximizing allocation (i.e. an optimal SMT given costs *b*), c(OPT(b)) the corresponding social welfare (i.e. cost of the Steiner tree), and  $c(\mathcal{A}(b))$  the welfare achieved with the approximation algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Since bidders are self-interested, their reported bids b do not necessarily reflect their true costs c. Instead, bidders try to maximize their quasilinear utilities  $u_i$ , i.e., payment received minus true cost:  $u_i(b) = p_i(b, f(b)) - c_i$ . As a result, a strategyproof mechanism must offer bidders some incentives to reveal their true costs.

**Definition 1: Strategyproofness** A mechanism  $\mathcal{M} = (f, p)$  is strategyproof if for all bidders  $i \in E$  and all reported bid tuples  $b \in B$  it holds that bidder *i* has a weakly higher payoff by telling the truth:

$$u_i(c_i, b_{-i}) \ge u_i(b) \tag{2}$$

We also consider the stronger criterion of weak group-strategyproofness, where it is impossible for a group of bidders to make all members of the group better off by lying.

**Definition 2 : Weak Group-Strategyproofness**<sup>1</sup> A mechanism  $\mathcal{M} = (f, p)$  is weakly group-strategyproof if for every set of bidders  $I \subseteq E$  and all reported bid tuples  $b \in B$  it holds that at least one bidder  $i \in E$  has a weakly higher payoff by telling the truth:

$$u_i(c_I, b_{-I}) \ge u_i(b) \tag{3}$$

Finally, to avoid monopoly, we restrict G to be 2-edge-connected, i.e., G remains connected even if any single edge is removed.

With this, we can now formulate the SMT problem as a mechanism design problem: Let G = (V, E, b) be a 2-edge-connected graph. |V| is the number of vertices, |E| is the number of edges/bidders, and *b* is the vector of reported bid prices. Let  $K \subseteq V$  be the set of terminals. Then the objective is to design a polynomial time approximation mechanism which computes an approximately efficient allocation *A*, and a payment scheme *p* which makes truthful bidding a dominant strategy, such that *p* and *A* form a strategyproof mechanism.

**Definition 3: Monotonic allocation rule** An allocation rule f of a mechanism  $\mathcal{M} = (f, p)$  is monotonic if a bidder i who wins with bid  $b_i$  keeps winning for any lower bid  $b'_i < b_i$  (for any fixed settings of the other bids).

**Definition 4: Critical payment scheme** A payment scheme p of a mechanism  $\mathcal{M} = (f, p)$  is critical if a winning bidder i receives payment  $p_i^*$ , which is her maximum bid allowed for winning:  $p_i^* := \sup \{b_i' \in B_i : i \in A(b_i', b_{-i})\}$ , where  $A(b_i', b_{-i})$  denotes the set of bidders that would have won if the reported bids were  $(b_i', b_{-i})$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Note that generally, threshold or clock auctions are not strongly group-strategyproof as pointed out in [12].

In his seminal paper, Myerson [23] showed that an allocation rule f is implementable (i.e. there exists a payment vector p such that  $\mathcal{M} = (f, p)$  is strategyproof) if and only if the allocation rule is monotonic. Moreover, if the allocation rule is monotonic and losing bidders pay 0, a critical payment scheme is the unique payment rule p such that  $\mathcal{M} = (f, p)$  is strategyproof. Hence, with single-dimensional types and monotonic approximation algorithms, we can implement an outcome in dominant strategies, if we compute critical payments.

## 4 Approximation Mechanisms for Single-Dimensional Bidders

In this section we briefly introduce important approximation algorithms for the SMT problem and provide a corresponding critical payment scheme. Finally, we design a deferred-acceptance auction for the SMT problem.

#### 4.1 Approximation Algorithms for the Steiner Minimum Tree

**Loss-Contracting Algorithms** Loss-contracting algorithms have been the most successful approach to the design of approximation algorithms for the SMT on graphs so far.

Any Steiner tree S(G, K) of G is either a full Steiner tree, i.e., all its terminals are leaves, or can be decomposed into a forest of full Steiner subtrees (full components) by splitting all the non-leaf terminals (splitting a terminal results in two copies of the same terminal). The algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky [21] builds an *MST* on the subgraph  $G_K$  induced by the terminal set K and repeatedly adds full components to improve the temporary solution. In each iteration, full components are ranked according to their gain (by how much the component improves the current temporary solution) divided by their loss (i.e., the cost committed by adding a component or more precisely its Steiner points). After a full component is added, the temporary solution is improved. This step also involves loss-contracting, a method to make components which are in conflict with added ones less appealing. By these means, the algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky [21] achieves an approximation ratio of 1.55 if  $k \to \infty$  and it is computable in  $\mathcal{O}(|K|^k \cdot |V - K|^{k-2} + k \cdot |K|^{2k+1} \log(|K|))$ . This is the best approximation algorithm so far, but unfortunately it is not monotonic.

**Distance-Network-based Approximations** Similarly to the loss-contracting approximation, the general idea of distance-network-based approximation algorithms is to build a *MST* on a complete subgraph  $G_K$  in the first phase. In the second phase, edges in  $MST(\overline{G})$  are re-transformed back to edges in G, and an MST is computed on the resulting graph to remove possible cycles. Finally, in the third phase, non-terminal leaves are deleted. This algorithm was proposed by Kou, Markowsky and Berman [18] and runs in  $\mathcal{O}(|K||V|^2)$ . However, due to the cycles that can occur in the first phase, this standard variant is not monotonic. Mehlhorn [19] designed an algorithm which differs in phase 1. Here, the algorithm first partitions G into Voronoi regions,

which are then utilized to construct a subgraph of  $G_K$ , called  $\overline{G}$ . It then proceeds with phase 2 and phase 3. This leads to a worst case run time of  $\mathcal{O}(|V| \log |V| + |E|)$  and achieves an approximation ratio of 2(1 - 1/l) where l is the minimal number of leaves in any SMT (which is naturally bounded above by the number of terminals). It can be shown that the modification of phase 1 leads to a monotonic allocation.

**Primal-Dual Approximation Algorithms** The approximation algorithm for the SMT problem by Goemans and Williamson [20] follows a primal-dual approach which requires a runtime of  $\mathcal{O}(|V|^2 \setminus \log |V|)$ , also has an approximation ratio of 2 and is monotonic.

#### 4.2 Payment Schemes

Since the allocations of the algorithms  $A^{MH}$  by Mehlhorn [19] and the primal-dual algorithm  $A^{PD}$  by Goemans and Williamson [20] are monotonic, they can be extended to a strategyproof approximation mechanism. To achieve this, the payment scheme p needs to find the critical payment  $p_i^*$  for any winner i, such that every reported bid  $b_i$  with  $b_i \le p_i^*$  is guaranteed to win, while every reported bid  $b_i$  with  $b_i > b_i^*$  is guaranteed to lose.

Gualà and Proietti [24] proposed a payment scheme which can be computed in  $\mathcal{O}((|V| + |K|^2)|E| \cdot \log \alpha(|E|, |V|))$  for distance-network based approximation algorithms. In this approach the critical payment for *e* is calculated by adding the difference between the original cost of the shortest path including *e* and the minimum cost of one of the alternative shortest paths without *e* which can be efficiently computed using several tweaks [24-26]. Computation of an alternative path in the distance network between two different terminals  $v'_1, v'_2$  can also be done efficiently by standard sensitivity analysis [27]. For the PD algorithm, a possibility of obtaining critical payments is by using binary search.

Since the payments described above are critical, they can be used in combination with their corresponding approximation algorithm to yield a strategy-proof approximation mechanism for single-dimensional bidders [23].

#### 4.3 Deferred-Acceptance Auctions

Greedy algorithms are an important class of approximation algorithms. A greedy-in algorithm iteratively chooses the best available option based on the current state (i.e., the previous iterations) and adds it to the solution. Contrarily, in the deferred-acceptance auction (DAA), a greedy-out algorithm is used which removes the least favourable alternative from the solution in every iteration.

A greedy-in procedure which greedily accepts edges is not suitable for constructing a Steiner tree, since greedily accepting edges leads to being forced to 'correct' the structure afterwards (e.g., assuring that Steiner points do not end up as leaves) while within a greedy-out procedure one only needs to assure that it is still possible to construct a Steiner tree based on the remaining edges (i.e. all terminals are still connected). Thus this section describes a greedy-out approximation for the Steiner tree problem implemented as a DAA [12]. The DAA is not only strategyproof but also weakly group-strategyproof and therefore provides a form of protection against bidder collusion.

The DAA greedily excludes the least desirable option from the solution until further removal would lead to an infeasible solution. To decide which option should be excluded in each iteration a scoring function is used. A scoring function assigns a value of at least 0 to an option i based only on the cost of i itself and what other options are still available (ignoring the other options' costs, however). In each iteration, an option with the highest assigned score is removed from the allocation, options that cannot be removed without making the resulting solution infeasible receive a score of 0. All remaining options with a score of 0 are accepted in the end. Hence, the algorithm always returns a feasible Steiner tree at the end.

The payment p(e) for an option *i* is calculated the moment we cannot exclude *i* from the solution any more, i.e. the moment we assign a score of 0 to it. The payment is equal to the bid *i* could have stated such that her score would have been equal to an option that was removed in the last iteration before her score was set to 0.

In a network procurement context, the set of options is the set of edges E. An edge cannot be excluded from the solution if its removal would lead G to split into two separate connected components, each of which contains at least one terminal. To account for the specific requirements of the network procurement context, we analyze three scoring functions in our experimental analysis:

- 1. the weight of the edge
- 2. the weight of the edge divided by the number of adjacent edges
- 3. the weight of the edge divided by the edge betweenness centrality of the edge, where all pairs of vertices are considered

We calculate betweenness centrality by using an algorithm due to Brandes [28] on a variant  $G_u$  of G where all edges have weight 1, i.e.  $G_u$  is the unweighted version of G. This is necessary, since due to incentive reasons a scoring function may only take the respective bid and the underlying graph structure into account, not the bids of other active bidders. Since in our environment bids are the cost of edges, when calculating the score of an edge e, we must ignore the costs of all other edges  $e' \neq e$  in our calculations. In the following, let  $DAA_w$  ( $DAA_a$ ;  $DAA_c$ ) denote the DAA with scoring by weight (divided by adjacent edges; betweenness centrality). The DAA for the SMT problem runs in  $\mathcal{O}(|E|^3 + |E|^2|V| + |E|t)$  including payment calculation where t is the time necessary to update the scores in each iteration.

Greedy algorithms are usually fast, but can lead to arbitrarily bad results compared to an optimal solution for some problems. For knapsack auctions and general combinatorial auctions with single-minded bidders, both of which are maximizing social welfare, [15] prove approximation ratios for the allocation algorithms used in their DAAs. However, their techniques are not directly applicable to the network procurement setting. For instance, consider the three weight functions discussed above and a network as given in Figure 1. The network consists of n nodes  $v_1, ..., v_n$ , two of which  $(v_1 \text{ and } v_n)$  are terminals. The optimal Steiner Tree consists of only keeping edge  $(v_1, v_n)$ , but under DAA this edge is rejected first under all weight functions, forcing the algorithm to accept all other n-1 edges in order to remain connected. This leads to an approximation ratio of (n-1)/2 proving the impossibility of a constant-factor approximation ratio. It remains an open question whether there exists a weight function that allows for such an approximation ratio, however this seems doubtful.

Figure 1. An example where DAA leads to an approximation ratio of (n-1)/2



## 5 Experimental Evaluation

We describe the data set before we discuss our results. All algorithms were implemented in Java. The experiments were executed on a laptop with Intel core i5-6600k (4 cores, 3.5 GHz) and 8GB RAM.

For the approximation mechanism based on [19] and the primal-dual algorithm [20], we computed the payments as described in Section 4.2. For the former, we employed the payment scheme for distance-network based approximation algorithms by Gualà and Proietti [24] and for the latter we calculated the payments based on binary search. For the DAA we use the threshold payments which are dynamically updated throughout the run of the algorithm as described in Section 4.3. Finally, we also included the VCG mechanism [29-31] as a baseline. We used the send-and-split method [32] as implemented by Iwata [33] to determine optimal solutions.

#### 5.1 Data

Experiments are conducted on set I080 of the SteinLib Testdata Library  $[34]^2$ . However, instances which are not 2-edge-connected are not considered since a monopoly edge would be worth infinite amounts of money. Instances with names ending on 0x or 3x are thus not considered, which leaves us with 60 instances all of which have 80 vertices. We cluster instances with the same number of terminals and edges, this gives twelve clusters consisting of five instances each. As a summary, only the mean values for each cluster are reported in this section. The full list of results is provided in the appendix. Overall, we have 60 instances and 6 algorithms resulting in 360 experiments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> http://steinlib.zib.de/showset.php?I080

#### 5.2 Results

Allocative Efficiency. In Table 2 and Table 3, we present the mean efficiency of the five instances for each of the twelve terminal-edge combinations we considered in our experimental evaluation. While the approximation algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky [21] is not monotonic and thus cannot be extended to an approximation mechanism, it is still interesting to compare its allocation efficiency to the other algorithms in a complete information setting. Overall,  $DAA_c$  and RZ were the best performing algorithms and the scoring function based on the betweenness centrality came out to be the best scoring function for DAAs. With a paired Wilcoxon rank sum test the differences in efficiency between  $DAA_a$  and RZ (p = 0.88), between  $DAA_c$ and RZ (p = 0.0005), and those between MH and PD (p = 0.155) were not significant at p < 0.0001, while all other pairwise comparisons were significant at this level. We also analyse differences in efficiency using a linear regression with efficiency as dependent variable, the algorithm, the number of edges and terminals as covariates. With the  $DAA_c$  as baseline, the differences to this greedy algorithm were positive and significant at the following levels:  $DAA_w$  (p < 0.0001), MH (p < 0.00010.0001), *PD* (p < 0.0001), *DAA*<sub>a</sub> (p < 0.01), and *RZ* (p < 0.01).

Table 2. Average efficiency

E,K	350,6	3160,6	632,6	350,8	3160,8	632,8
<i>RZ</i> (k=3)	1.07	1.23	1.13	1.11	1.26	1.17
МН	1.16	1.26	1.30	1.29	1.31	1.34
PD	1.15	1.26	1.28	1.31	1.31	1.33
$DAA_w$	2.27	2.27	2.19	2.25	2.40	2.13
DAA <sub>a</sub>	1.21	1.47	1.27	1.17	1.35	1.19
DAA <sub>c</sub>	1.30	1.14	1.24	1.18	1.10	1.16

E,K	350,16	3160,16	632,16	350,20	3160,20	632,20
<i>RZ</i> (k=3)	1.19	1.30	1.24	1.21	1.32	1.24
МН	1.25	1.39	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.33
PD	1.26	1.39	1.30	1.31	1.40	1.32
$DAA_w$	1.67	1.85	1.83	1.59	1.71	1.54
$DAA_a$	1.14	1.26	1.11	1.11	1.18	1.10
$DAA_c$	1.16	1.06	1.10	1.11	1.06	1.08

Table 3. Average efficiency (continued)

Let us now report averages for different subgroups of the experiments in more detail. The algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky performs best for sparse instances, on average finding a solution only 25% worse than the optimum and even solutions as good as 1.01 times the optimum (instance I080 - 015 of SteinLib). Moreover, it performs well for complete graphs, too (1.3 approximation ratio). Mehlhorn's algorithm and the primal-dual algorithm achieve similar results (130% - 140% of the optimum).

The performance of the DAA heavily depends on the scoring function. Using only the weight of an edge  $c_e$  as a score, allocative efficiency is never better than 1.48 times of the optimum, usually worse than 1.6 times of the optimum and even 2.97 in one instance (I080 – 022). It seems clear, that without taking into account the structure of the graph, the greedy algorithm employed in  $DAA_w$  can not compete with more sophisticated methods. Even in later stages of the DAA, edges are only selected based on their individual cost without considering the possible paths this edge is a part on. If we use edge weight divided by number of adjacent edges as scoring function, the DAA already performs better than the primal-dual algorithm for most sets of instances and even achieves results that are better than the results of the algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky for instances with 16 or more terminals. Results are between 1.06 and 1.6 times the optimum value with 39 out of 60 results lying between 1.1 and 1.55 times the optimum. This variant performs significantly better than the  $DAA_w$  (on a significance level of 0.1%).

Finally, the  $DAA_c$  generally provides better results on average than the algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky for k = 3. On sparse instances with only 6 terminals the algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky still performs slightly better. For these instances, the  $DAA_c$  computes solutions that are up to 1.55 times the optimum value, although most of the solutions achieve an approximation ratio of 1.3 or lower.

Allocative Efficiency depending on the number of terminals. The results show clearly that performance of all DAA variants increases as the number of terminals grows. This is to be expected since a greedy-out procedure actually solves MST optimally and the SMT problem becomes more like the MST problem for an increasing number of terminals (in the limit, when all vertices are terminal, they are identical). Contrarily, all other algorithms perform worse the more terminals are present in the graph. Moreover, it can be seen that efficiency of  $DAA_a$  and  $DAA_c$  is nearly identical for sparse graphs. In sparse graph, the number of possible paths between two nodes is very limited. Since an edge e with a lot of adjacent edges naturally allows for more paths (and hence also more shortest paths) to pass through e, the betweenness centrality of e is very dependent on its adjacent edges. Therefore, the DAAs with the corresponding scoring functions perform very similarly.

Allocative Efficiency depending on density. It can be seen that the efficiency of the  $DAA_w$  and the  $DAA_a$  decreases as instances with an increasing number of edges are considered. The algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky experiences the same behavior. However, the opposite is true for the  $DAA_c$ .

**Table 2** and **Table 3** show that the  $DAA_a$  and the  $DAA_c$  find similarly efficient solutions for sparse graphs, where no significant difference was observed. For complete graphs, every node has the same number of neighbors at the beginning. Therefore, before that crucial number of edges has been removed, the  $DAA_a$  makes the same choices the  $DAA_w$  makes. In this case, the efficiency of the  $DAA_a$  is substantially worse (up to 1.39 times the optimum). The solutions found by the  $DAA_c$  are never worse than 1.09 times the optimum and in eight out of ten instances at most 6% worse than the optimal value for complete graphs with 16 or 20 terminals.

**Runtime.** In the following, we discuss the combined runtime required for the approximation mechanism to obtain both, allocation and payments (cf. **Table 4** and **Table 5**). The differences between  $DAA_w$  and  $DAA_c$  (p = 0.9794) as well as between  $DAA_a$  and  $DAA_w$  (p = 0.002) are not significant at a level of p < 0.0001 using a Wilcoxon rank sum test, the other pairs were significantly different. Only the mechanism based on Mehlhorn's algorithm and the primal dual approach are significantly different from *VCG* (p < 0.0001). Our experiments show that *PD* and *MH* are by far the fastest. Runtimes observed are lower than 13s on average on the set of instances with high numbers of both terminals and edges (**Table 5**). Performance for lower numbers of terminals or edges is even better. Arguably, the more advanced payment computation used within *MH* leads to faster completion than calculating prices for *PD*, although we observed higher allocation runtime of the primal dual algorithm when prices were not considered. Interestingly, Mehlhorn's algorithm with payment is faster than the primal-dual algorithm despite larger allocation time. This is evidently due to the more enhanced payment computation.

The runtime required by all DAA variants is very dependent on the density of the graph while it scales very well with the number of terminals. In our test instances, the computation time even decreases with an increasing number of terminals; in contrast to all other mechanisms. *VCG* in particular, is very sensitive to higher number of terminals. Calculating exact solutions for SMT problems in the case of 20 terminals proved to be computationally inefficient, requiring a factor of 40 up to 28.000 of the runtime as compared to the best performing DAA variants. Differences between the scoring functions are very small. Interestingly, the  $DDA_w$  is slower than the  $DAA_c$  on complete graphs. This might be due to the fact that edges scoring 0 early in the computation do not need to be assessed in later iterations and the  $DAA_c$  possibly finding more of these edges earlier than the  $DAA_w$ .

E,K	350,6	3160,6	632,6	350,8	3160,8	632,8
МН	0.24	0.46	0.17	0.19	0.61	0.29
PD	0.28	3.14	0.56	0.59	4.66	0.92
$DAA_w$	1.37	1553.71	10.29	1.29	1678.19	10.15
$DAA_a$	1.39	1167.31	10.65	1.26	1392.11	10.35
$DAA_{c}$	2.34	1476.72	12.89	2.19	1596.73	12.57
VCG	2.05	1.80	1.71	2.82	2.34	2.54

Table 4. Runtime combined means

E,K	350,16	3160,16	632,16	350,20	3160,20	632,20
МН	0.52	1.01	0.33	0.33	1.26	0.49
PD	1.01	9.91	1.44	1.93	12.97	1.90
DAAw	1.35	1668.95	10.38	1.39	1478.79	9.84
$DAA_a$	1.33	1368.65	10.28	1.39	1230.18	9.89
DAA <sub>c</sub>	2.22	1547.89	12.91	2.32	1377.29	12.23
VCG	638.87	532.76	646.89	67544.54	58556.20	67595.38

 Table 5. Runtime combined means (continued)

## 6 Conclusions

The design of electronic markets has a number of challenges due to the fact that multiple self-interested parties participate. Incentive-compatibility is an important property in order to select the efficient allocation in the presence of strategic bidders. Unfortunately, the well-known VCG mechanism requires exact solutions of the allocation problem, which is often intractable. The SMT is a case in point. It is NP-hard and one cannot expect to solve this problem exactly for realistic problem sizes.

There is an established literature of approximation algorithms for SMT problem. However, not all approximation algorithms can be extended to strategyproof approximation mechanisms. The best known algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky violates monotonicity, a necessary condition for strategyproofness. However, the algorithms by Mehlhorn [19] and the primal-dual algorithm by Goemans and Williamson [20] are monotonic. Adding a critical payment rule to these algorithms leads to polynomial-time and strategyproof 2-approximation mechanisms.

We designed a deferred-acceptance auction for the SMT problem and analyzed several scoring functions. Overall, the results show that DAAs (foremost  $DAA_c$ ) yield very good results (efficiency and cost) at low computation times. The DAA combines high average efficiency (as compared to MH, PD, and even RZ) with a low runtime compared to VCG. Moreover, the DAA is the only mechanism that offers weak group-strategyproofness. This property makes the DAA an appealing choice for network procurement applications, where collusion is an issue. While the worst-case approximation ratio can be quite low, the average-case solution quality is remarkably high, as shown in our numerical experiments based on the SteinLib.

While the VCG mechanism is the approach an auctioneer should follow to minimize payments it experiences a steep increase in runtime as the number of terminals grows. For these instances, the MH mechanism exhibits low payments and runtime, but it is less efficient compared to others.

Finally, it is important to note that the performance of the DAA is dependent on the scoring function. On average, the efficiency of algorithms with a scoring function based on betweenness centrality is very good and competitive with the best approximation algorithms for the SMT problem.

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# 8 Appendix: Approximation Algorithms for the minimum Steiner tree

In 8.1 we discuss loss-contraction algorithms on the basis of the algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky [21], in Section 8.2 we consider distance-network based approaches, in Section 8.3 the primal-dual approximation, and in Section 8.4. the DAA.

## 8.1 Loss-Contracting Approximation: The Algorithm by Robins and Zelikovsky

Any Steiner tree S(G, K) of *G* is either a full Steiner tree, i.e., all its terminals are leaves, or can be decomposed into a forest of full Steiner subtrees (full components). A *k*-restricted full component *F* is a full component with  $k \ge 3$  terminals. By  $C_l[F]$  we denote the loss-contracted full component of *F*. We define the gain and loss of a full component *F* formally and then describe the execution of Algorithm 1 below.

**Definition 5 (Gain and Loss of a Full Component (Robins and Zelikovsky, 2005))** Let *T* be a tree spanning *K* and *F* be an arbitrary full component of *G* given *K*. Let T[F] be a minimum cost graph in  $F \cup T$  which contains *F* completely and spans all terminals in *K*. This means T[F] is the result of replacing a part of the tree *T* with the full component *F*.

Then the Gain of F w.r.t. T is the cost difference between T and T[F]:

$$gain_{T}(F) = cost(T) - cost(T[F])$$
(4)

The Loss of *F* is a minimum-cost subforest of *F* containing a path from each Steiner point in *F* to one of its terminals:  $Loss(F) = MST(F \cup E_0(F)) \setminus E_0(F)$ , where  $E_0(F)$  denotes a complete graph containing all terminals of *F*, with all edge costs being 0. It follows that

$$loss(F) = cost(MST(F \cup E_0(F)) \setminus E_0(F))$$
(5)

**Data:** 2-connected graph G = (V, E, b), terminal set  $K \subseteq V$ , an integer k with  $3 \le k \le |K|$  **Result:** A k-restricted Steiner tree S(G) in G spanning K01 Compute  $G_V$  and  $G_K$ 02  $T = MST(G_K)$ 03 **repeat** 04 Find a k-restricted full component F maximizing  $r = gain_T(F)/loss(F)$ 05  $G_K = G_K \cup F$ 06  $T = MST(T \cup C_l[F])$ 07 **until**  $r \le 0$ 08  $S(G, K) = MST(G_K)$ 09 Replace artificial edges in S(G, K)10 Cut Steiner point leaves of S(G, K)11 **return** S(G, K)

Algorithm 1: Approximation Allocation Algorithm A<sup>RZ</sup>

The algorithm starts by computing the complete graph  $G_V$  based on shortest paths, its subgraph  $G_K$  induced by the terminal set K (Line 1) and the MST on  $G_K$  (Line 2). Afterwards, the gain-over-loss ratios for all k-restricted full components are computed. After choosing the full component with the highest gain-over-loss ratio, the selected component is added to  $G_K$  (Line 5). The component is also added to T in loss-contracted form  $C_l[F]$  (Line 6). To contract the loss of a full component F, we merge every connected tree of the forest Loss(F) into a single vertex, the respective terminal of the component. Two terminals are connected in  $C_l[F]$  if their respective components in Loss(F) have an adjacent edge in F and the cost of the edge in  $C_l[F]$ is equal to the cost of the respective edge in F.

After  $C_l[F]$  was added to T, an MST is built on  $T \cup C_l[F]$ . By improving T the gain-over-loss ratio for the remaining full components is decreasing. Eventually, all components will have a gain-over-loss ratio of at most zero. At this point, the algorithm computes the  $MST(G_K)$  (Line 8), transforms all its artificial edges back into original edges, i.e. replaces artificial edges by the respective shortest path, and cuts leaves which are Steiner points (Lines 9, 10).

#### 8.2 Distance-Network-based Approximation: The Algorithm by Mehlhorn

Mehlhorn's algorithm [19] partitions G into Voronoi regions, which are then utilized to construct a subgraph of  $G_K$ , called  $\overline{G}$ , in the first phase. In the second phase, edges (shortest paths) in the MST are decomposed into edges in E, and a MST is computed on the resulting graph to remove possible cycles. Finally, in the third phase, nonterminal leaves are deleted. We give definitions for Voronoi regions and  $\overline{G}$ , and provide a short pseudo code representation of the algorithm (Algorithm 2).

**Definition 6** (Voronoi Regions V(s)) Given a general graph G = (V, E, b) and the set of terminals  $K \subseteq V$ , the Voronoi region V(s) of a terminal  $s \in K$  contains all vertices  $v \in V$  for which the shortest path  $sp(s, v) \leq sp(t, v)$  for all  $t \in K$ . We break ties randomly, such that each vertex v uniquely belongs to one such region.

**Definition 7** (Distance Network based on *V*) Let  $\overline{G} = (K, E_{\overline{G}}, b_{\overline{G}})$  be the distance network with edges and weights as follows:

 $(s,t) \in E_{\bar{g}} \Leftrightarrow \exists (u,v) \in E \text{ such that } u \in V(s) \text{ and } v \in V(t)$ (6)  $b_{\bar{g}}(s,t) = \min\{sp(s,u) + b(u,v) + sp(v,t) : u \in V(s), v \in V(t), (u,v) \in E\}$ (7)

**Data:** 2-connected graph G = (V, E, b), terminal set  $K \subseteq V$  **Result:** A Steiner tree S(G, K) in G spanning K01 Compute Voronoi regions of G and generate  $\overline{G}$ 02  $S(G, K) = MST(\overline{G})$ 03 Replace artificial edges in S(G, K)04 Cut non-terminal leaves of S(G, K)05 **return** S(G, K)

Algorithm 2: Approximation Allocation Algorithm A<sup>MH</sup>

#### 8.3 Primal-Dual Approximation Algorithms

This section describes the general approach for primal-dual approximations and the approximation algorithm for the minimum Steiner tree problem by Goemans and Williamson [20]. Many problems in graph theory can be reduced to the hitting set problem. For a groundset E with cost  $c_e \ge 0$  for every element  $e \in E$  and subsets  $T_1, T_2 \dots T_n \subseteq E$ , the hitting set problem is to find a subset  $A \subseteq E$  of minimal cost such that  $A \cap T_i \ne \emptyset$  for all subsets  $i = \{1, \dots n\}$ . The primal integer program for the hitting set problem can be formulated as follows:

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{Min } \sum_{e \in e} c_e x_e \\ \text{subject to } \sum_{e \in T_i} x_e \geq 1, \ \forall i \\ x_e \in \{0,1\} \end{array}$ 

To obtain the relaxation, simply the constraint  $x_e \in \{0, 1\}$  needs to be relaxed to  $x_e \ge 0$ . The corresponding dual program is stated below:

 $\begin{array}{l} \operatorname{Max} \sum_{i} y_{i} \\ \text{subject to } \sum_{i:e \in T_{i}} y_{i} \leq c_{e}, \ \forall e \in E \\ y_{i} \geq 0 \ \forall i \end{array}$ 

To obtain an  $\alpha$ -approximation we compute a solution  $\bar{x}$  to the primal integer program and a solution y to the dual of the relaxed primal program such that  $\sum_{e \in E} c_e \bar{x}_e \leq \alpha \sum_{i=1}^n y_i$ .

Mapping the hitting set problem to the minimum Steiner tree problem is straightforward: the ground-set is given by the edges *E* of the graph and  $c_e$  is the cost of the respective edge  $e \in E$ . Let  $S_i$  be a subset of vertices that contains at least one, but not all terminals, i.e. a cut. When all cuts are crossed, the solution is a feasible allocation for the minimum Steiner tree problem. By definition, the edges adjacent to exactly one vertex  $v \in S_i$  are the edges crossing the cut  $S_i$ . Let  $\delta(S_i)$  denote the set of these edges. Let  $T_i = \delta(S_i)$ .

Algorithm 3 describes the necessary steps to compute A. During the initialization, A is empty and all dual variables y are set to 0 (Lines 1, 2). In each iteration, we compute U to contain all  $T_k$  that are unsatisfied and minimal, i.e. there is no unsatisfied set  $T_j$  with  $T_j \subset T_k$  (Line 5). Afterwards, the dual variables  $y_k$  corresponding to set in U are increased (loaded) until one of the constraints holds with equality (it goes "tight", Line 6). The corresponding element e is then added to the solution. If the allocation A is feasible, the algorithm stops and conducts a reverse deletion (Lines 9 - 14). In this phase, edges are assessed in regard to their necessity in reversed order (LIFO). Unnecessary edges either connect a Steiner point as a leaf or close a cycle. In either case, the edge is not contributing to the solution (apart from inflicting costs). Finally, the solution is returned.

**Data:** 2-connected graph G = (V, E, b), terminal set  $K \subseteq V$ **Result:** A Steiner tree S(G) in G spanning K  $01 \ y = 0 \ \forall y$  $02 A_0 = \emptyset$ 03 i = 004 while A<sub>i</sub> not feasible do 05 Choose violated sets U Increase  $y_k$  uniformly for all  $T_k \in U$  until  $\exists e_i \notin A_i$  s.t.  $\sum_{i:e_i \in T_i} y_i = c_{e_i}$ 06 07  $A_i = A_i \cup \{e_i\}$ 08 i = i + 109 end  $10 A' = A_{i-1}$ 11 for i;  $i \ge 0$ ; i = i - 1 do 12 if  $A' \setminus \{e_{t_i}\}$  still feasible then  $A' = A' \setminus \{e_{t_i}\}$ 13 14 end 15 end 16 **return** A'

Algorithm 3: Approximation Allocation Algorithm A<sup>PD</sup>

#### 8.4 Deferred Acceptance Auctions for Steiner Trees

The DAA greedily excludes the least desirable option from the solution until further removal would lead to an infeasible solution. Algorithm 4 shows an implementation of the DAA for the Steiner tree problem. To decide which option should be excluded in each iteration a scoring function is used. In each iteration, the scoring function assigns a value of at least 0 to an edge e (Line 2) based only on the cost of e itself and what other options are still available (ignoring the other options' costs, however). Edges that cannot be removed without making the resulting solution infeasible receive a score of 0. When a score of 0 is assigned to an edge the first time we compute the payment p(e) (Lines 3, 4) This payment is equal to the cost e could have stated such that her score would have been equal to an edge that was removed in the last iteration before her score was set to 0. If there are edges with a positive score left the highest scoring edge is removed from the solution (Line 9), otherwise the algorithm terminates.

**Data:** 2-connected graph G = (V, E, b), terminal set  $K \subseteq V$ , scoring function *s* **Result:** A Steiner tree in *G* spanning *K* 

01 for each edge e do

- 02 assign score s(e) to e
- 03 **if** s(e) = 0 **then**
- 04 compute payment p(e)
- 05 **end**
- 06 if highest score equals 0 then
- 07 return remaining edges (Steiner tree)
- 08 **end**
- 09 remove *e* with the highest score
- 10 **end**
- 11 return remaining edges

Algorithm 4: Deferred-Acceptance Auction